Working Paper

Livelihoods and welfare: Findings from the seventh round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (January–June 2024)

The seventh round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, was implemented between April–June 2024 with a recall period covering January to June of the same year. It follows six rounds of surveys that were carried out since the beginning of December 2021. This report documents livelihood and welfare dynamics over this survey period. Overall, household welfare has deteriorated in Myanmar considerably over the past two years. In terms of income sources, household farming, farm wages, and non-farm businesses are the most important livelihoods in rural areas while non-farm businesses and non-farm salary employment are most important in urban areas. However, in terms of primary livelihoods, we witness a structural shift in livelihood profiles of rural households with fewer households identifying non-farm business income are their primary livelihood (4.1 percentage points decrease) while more households rely on farm wages (2.9 percentage points increase). There are also fewer reported sources of income with households on average reporting 1.6 income sources, compared to almost 2 years ago. The primary source of income is shifting to low-paying livelihoods like wage work, with remittances and assistance serve as supplementary income sources. A combination of increasing prices and growing reliance on low paying livelihoods over the past years led to a significant decline in household purchasing power. Median real household income per adult equivalent per day declined by 8.4 percent over the past year between the first half of 2023 and 2024 and by 18.2 percent over the two-year period between the first half of 2022 and 2024. Over the same period, the headcount rate of poverty increased to 63.6 percent in the first half of 2024 from 60.9 percent a year back in 2023 and 56.2 percent two years back in 2022. Wage earning households continue to be extremely vulnerable with the lowest median real daily income per adult equivalent as well as the livelihood category with the highest level of poverty. With respect to states/regions, poverty is the highest in states engulfed by high levels of conflict, for example, Rakhine, Chin and Kayah. A notable trend in recent years is the faster increase in urban poverty. Urban poverty increased by 9.2 percentage points over the past year from the first half of 2023 to the first half of 2024, while it increased by 14.7 percentage points over the past two years from the first half of 2022 to first half of 2024. On the other hand, rural poverty only increased by 0.2 percentage points in the past year and 4.6 percentage points in the past two years. There are only a few strategies helping households stay out of poverty, including earning income from farming (which has partially benefited from higher output prices), migrating with the whole household, and receiving assistance or remittances. The presence of remittance income significantly reduces a household’s probability of being poor by a notable 21 percentage points. There are many inter-linked factors that have led to the deterioration in welfare in Myanmar in recent years, including escalating conflict, macroeconomic mismanagement and inflation in particular, the breakdown of social protection, and the absence or deterioration of many other critical services normally provided by the state, including healthcare and nutrition, education, agricultural extension, financial programs for the poor, infrastructure development and social protection.

The state of food security and nutrition in Myanmar 2021-24: Findings from seven rounds of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey

This working paper explores the state of food security and nutrition in Myanmar using seven rounds of nationally representative household panel data collected from December 2021 to July 2024. Overall, the state of food security and nutrition has deteriorated in Myanmar in 2021-24. More than three percent of households were in moderate to severe hunger in April-July 2024. Hunger was highest in Chin (14.4 percent), as well as Rakhine (8.0 percent) and Kayah (5.2 percent) in the latest survey round. Households with a low food consumption score increased from 9.4 percent in December 2021-February 2022 to 17.7 percent in April-June 2023 and remains high at 13.5 percent in April-July 2024. The shares in April-July 2024 were highest in Kayah (52.3 percent), Chin (33.9 percent), and Shan (21.1 percent). Inadequate diet diversity among adults rose from 20.6 percent to 25 percent over December 2021-February 2022 to April-July 2024. Women saw a faster decline in diet quality from December-February 2022 to April-July 2024 (6.3 percentage points increase in poor diet quality vs 2.4 percentage points for men). Decreases in diet quality among adults are driven by lower consumption of nuts and seeds and milk/dairy products. 29.5 percent of all children aged 6-23 months and 20.9 percent of all children aged 6-59 months had inadequate diet quality in the latest round of survey. Regression analysis reveals low income and limited assets to be important risk factors for food security and adequate diet quality. Wage workers and low wage communities are found to be particularly vulnerable. Rising food prices, conflict and physical insecurity increase the likelihood of poor diet quality. Receiving remittances is a source of resilience; remittance-receiving households are less likely to experience hunger or poor dietary diversity at the household, adult, and child level. To avert a full-blown nutrition crisis in Myanmar, effective multisectoral steps are required to protect nutritionally vulnerable populations. Expanded implementation of nutrition- and gender-sensitive social protection programs, including maternal and child cash transfers, particularly to vulnerable groups is called for. Further, given the importance of remittances as an effective coping mechanism, supporting migration and the flow of remittances would help to improve the welfare of the Myanmar population.

Community and household shocks: Findings from the seventh round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (January–June 2024)

The seventh round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, was implemented between April and June 2024. It follows six rounds that were carried out since the beginning of December 2021. This report discusses the findings from the seventh round related to shocks including conflict, climatic, service sector, and economic. The security situation in Myanmar continued to worsen during the seventh-round recall period, which spanned from January to June 2024. Households felt insecure in their communities, as reported by 23 percent of households, and had low levels of trust in their communities, as reported also by 23 percent of households. This is because crime and violence remained high, affecting 16 and 9 percent of communities, respectively. Lawlessness continues to be a widespread issue in Myanmar. In January–June 2024, 18 percent of households reported a lot or some gambling in their community and 13 percent reported drug use. These issues were more prominent in urban areas, compared to rural areas. A new challenge is risk of conscription, reported by 39 percent of households. Another crucial challenge is that 13 percent of respondents felt that it was dangerous for them to move around and do everyday tasks. Finally, three percent of respondents revealed that there was a risk of kidnapping in their community.

How have foreign exchange market distortions and conflict affected agricultural production incentives in Myanmar?

Fluctuations in agricultural prices pose significant challenges for fragile and conflict-affected economies due to their critical role in ensuring food security. This study examines changes in agricultural prices at the export, wholesale, and farm level in the case of Myanmar, which experienced a surge in conflicts from 2021 onward, following a military coup. The major findings are as follows:
• Regarding macroeconomic impacts, the military government implemented a dual exchange rate system, maintaining a fixed exchange rate significantly below the market rate and effectively imposing an across-the-board export tax on all export commodities of approximately 24 percent between August 2022 and August 2024. This policy particularly affects rice, Myanmar’s main staple and a key export crop.
• The scarcity of foreign exchange due to this dual exchange rate system increased the costs of imported inputs. It is estimated that prices of inorganic fertilizers – farmers’ most important commercial input – saw an increase of 10 percent compared to the price in Thailand since the start of the dual exchange rate system.
• Regarding domestic trade effects, regions with the highest insecurity exhibited similar agricultural output prices but higher input costs, resulting in reduced farm profitability compared to more secure regions. However, the magnitude of these effects is relatively small, with estimated increases in input prices due to insecurity ranging from one to six percent. Insecure areas also show more often a lack of input availability.
• Farmers who reside in insecure areas reported between one and six percentage points higher lack of access to agricultural inputs – fertilizer, agrochemicals, mechanization, and seed - in their communities. The relatively small effects of insecurity on input and output markets suggest a degree of resilience in the private sector’s ability to maintain trade under conflict conditions.
• The biggest effect on input markets is seen in the case of agricultural labor. Depending on the measure used, farmers in the most insecure areas had a 7 to 15 percentage points higher likelihood of reporting lack of access to agricultural laborers compared to the most secure areas.
• The exchange rate policies are found to have been much more harmful for farmers’ incentives than the domestic trade effects, even for the most conflict-affected areas, indicating the importance of considering macroeconomic effects for agricultural incentives in Myanmar.
• Despite the significant disincentives brought about by conflict, the agricultural sector has shown surprising resilience over the recent conflict period, seemingly linked to advantageous international price developments for farmers: international rice prices increased by 27 percent while urea prices decreased by 52 percent between August 2022 and May 2024.
• While these international evolutions have partly mitigated the impact of the conflict on farmers’ profitability, the impacts of these price developments on consumers in Myanmar have, however, been severe. An analysis of rice retail prices in Myanmar over the last two and half years show that they have more than tripled and that the overall costs of the common diet more than doubled. A failure of nominal income to keep pace with this food price inflation led to an increase in poverty by 10 percent from the end of 2022 to the end of 2023.

Oilseed farming in Myanmar: An analysis of practice, productivity, and profitability: Assessment of the 2023 monsoon

We have analyzed oilseed production patterns, productivity, and profitability for the 2023 monsoon season from the Myanmar Agriculture Performance Survey (MAPS), conducted at the beginning of 2024. This survey encompassed plots managed by 802 oilseed producers, distributed across all states/regions of the country. Our findings reveal:
1. Overall, oilseed productivity increased by an average of 2 percent during the 2023 monsoon compared to the previous year. Performance differed by crop with soybean and sesame experiencing moderate increases in yield, while groundnut and sunflower witnessed a decline in average yields of one percent. This mediocre performance stemmed from low input usage (particularly fertilizer), similar labor inputs, and a high occurrence of natural shocks, notably pests, diseases, and weeds, and heavy rain and storms.
2. Despite decreasing fertilizer prices, chemical fertilizer use remained low in oilseed production, with 45 percent of farmers using chemical fertilizer in monsoon 2023. Further, chemical fertilizer use did not increase in oilseed production compared to the previous monsoon.
3. Organic fertilizer use, on the other hand, is high in oilseed production, as 63 percent of farmers applied it in the 2023 monsoon season. During this time, organic fertilizer was used by 74 percent of groundnut farmers and 76 percent of oilseed farmers in the Dry Zone. This is due to the availability of organic manure in the Dry Zone where oilseed production is high.
4. Groundnut, soybean, and sesame farmers relied on seeds saved from last year’s harvest, while 67 percent of sunflower farmers purchased seeds from ag-input retailers or the government. The percentage of oilseed farmers using self-preserved seed – instead of obtaining it from the market - increased by 9 percentage points compared to last monsoon.
5. Draught animal ownership remains important for oilseed production, especially in the Dry Zone. Seventy-one percent of oilseed farmers used draught animals in production, with 50 percent using their owned draught animals.
6. Thirty-nine percent of oilseed farmers reported being impacted by climatic or other production shocks during this monsoon, with pests, diseases, and weeds (reported by 36 percent of farmers who experienced shocks), heavy rain/ storms (reported by 34 percent), droughts (reported by 22 percent), and irregular rainfall (reported by 21 percent) having significant adverse effects on yields.
7. Oilseed prices at the farm level increased by between 20 (soybean) and 45 (sunflower) percent, reflecting changes in international oilseed prices as well as the depreciation of the MMK.
8. Real – in terms of the cost of an average food basket – gross margins from oilseed farming during the monsoon of 2023 increased by between 2 (soybean and groundnut) and 12 (sesame) percent compared to the previous year. Real sunflower gross margins declined. At the same time, nominal profits increased by 33 percent since the previous monsoon. High price inflation tempered the increase in real profits.
9. Twenty percent of oilseed farmers faced significant issues in terms of marketing, including low prices for crops, insecurity, and having trouble reaching traders. These issues likely decreased the profitability of oilseed farming for the affected farmers.
10. Oilseed farmers reflecting on this monsoon compared to last, perceived higher profits, suggesting that the oilseed sector continues to be a lucrative choice for farmers.
These findings have several policy implications:
1. Ensure access to quality seeds: Reusing seeds from previous seasons reduces yields, especially when combined with climate shocks. The private sector should make quality seeds and seeds with high oil content available to boost oilseed crop yields.
2. Promote organic fertilizer use: Organic fertilizer is predominantly used in the Dry Zone. Expand its use to other agro-ecological zones to improve long-term soil fertility and help farmers mitigate the impact of fluctuating chemical fertilizer prices. The private sector and NGOs through in-person and online platforms can provide training on making compost from farm residues for farmers without access to animal manures.
3. Enhance pest and disease management: The private sector should provide farmers with access to better pest and disease management resources, including training and access to effective, environmentally friendly pesticides and herbicides.
4. Strengthen climate resilience: The private sector can strengthen climate resilience by developing and disseminating climate-resilient agricultural practices, providing training on drought-tolerant and flood-resistant crop varieties through in-person and online platforms, and offering financial incentives and technological support to farmers.
5. Create secure marketing channels: Farmers face low crop prices and safety issues during trade, along with difficulties in reaching traders due to security concerns. Develop secure and stable marketing channels to address these challenges.
6. Increase loans for oilseed crops: Given the higher production costs of groundnut, sesame, and soybean compared to sunflower, MADB should increase their loan amounts for these crops to enhance their productivity. The private sector could also lend money to oilseed farmers, given the increase in oilseed production stemming from their perceived profitability and importance to the government.

Myanmar Agricultural Performance Survey (Monsoon 2023): Farming environment and farm commercialization

We have analyzed the farming environment and farm commercialization situation for the 2023 monsoon season from the Myanmar Agriculture Performance Survey (MAPS), conducted at the beginning of 2024. This survey encompassed almost 4,400 crop producers in the monsoon, distributed across all states/regions of the country. Our findings reveal:
1. The security situation in Myanmar continues to pose concerns for farmers, impacting their commercialization practices. During the interview period (January – March 2024):
1.1) 31 percent of farmers reported feeling 'very insecure' or 'insecure'.
1.2) 22 percent expressed serious security concerns while moving around.
1.3) 8 percent stated that conflict in their area prevented the cultivation of some agricultural fields.
1.4) 1.4 percent reported land confiscation as a problem in their community.
1.5) 11 percent indicated fear of storing produce at home due to the risk of confiscation or destruction.
2. Security challenges for farming vary across states and regions, with the Delta area - the country's rice bowl - experiencing relatively better conditions.
3. Limited access to fuel, crucial for irrigation and mechanization among others, poses a significant constraint to farming. Nationally, about a quarter of Burmese farmers reported either no or rare availability of fuel in their communities during the monsoon and post/premonsoon periods. This situation is exacerbated in conflict-affected areas such as Rakhine, Chin, and Kayah, with Rakhine experiencing a dramatic worsening in recent months, with 81 percent of farmers reporting fuel scarcity in the post/pre-monsoon period.
4. Agricultural inputs were generally accessible during the 2023 monsoon season, indicating the resilience of the private sector in delivering these inputs. However, 4 percent of farmers reported unavailability of chemical fertilizers, while 6 percent faced difficulties in accessing mechanization and 18 percent in securing agricultural labor.
5. Input prices increased during the 2023 monsoon compared to the same period in 2022, with mechanized plowing costs rising by 20 percent, and hired labor costs for men and women increasing by 19 percent and 23 percent, respectively. Conversely, urea prices decreased by 15 percent.
6. In the post/pre-monsoon of 2024, wages saw substantial increases compared to the monsoon, especially for men, with a 15 percent rise, possibly linked to the new conscription law.
7. Nearly all crop prices increased compared to the previous monsoon. Paddy prices surged by 64 percent. Conversely, maize prices experienced an 11 percent decrease, likely due to transportation issues via Myawaddy, the border town for trade with Thailand.
8. Most farmers reported higher crop sales income this year compared to the previous one. However, 14 percent of farmers reported lower sales incomes.
9. Farmers in remote and conflict-affected areas face significant disadvantages in farm commercialization. Insecurity and isolation are primarily linked to higher input costs, while output prices are similar or lower compared to secure and well-connected areas. Consequently, farming profitability in these regions is reduced, impacting farmers' income and welfare.

Conflict and agricultural performance: Evidence from Myanmar

Recent years have witnessed an escalation in conflict, especially in developing countries where a significant proportion of the population relies on agriculture. It is crucial to understand how these conflicts impact agricultural production, given its importance for food security and agricultural transformation in these regions. However, research exploring how persistent conflicts affect agriculture is still nascent. Our study adds to this body of research by establishing a causal link between ongoing conflicts and their impact on paddy production, a primary staple crop in Myanmar. This analysis is based on data from a nationally representative phone survey conducted amidst active conflicts. We find that conflict adversely affects paddy production in various ways, including decreases in production and yield, as well as decreases in farmgate prices and the value of production. Our analysis reveals that conflict events, particularly those targeting civilians, have more pronounced negative effects on paddy production, yield, farmgate prices, and the value of production compared to non-targeted conflict incidents that do not purposively target civilians but could potentially disrupt input and output markets. The timing of conflict also significantly affects paddy production, with incidents occurring in mid-season, and during pre-planting and planting periods being the most damaging. Conflict leads to a decrease in the land area devoted to paddy cultivation, lowered probability and intensity of compound fertilizer usage, and an increased reliance on possibly lower quality seeds and exchange labor use. Our findings provide timely and informative insights for development partners and policy frameworks, highlighting the need for emergency assistance and intervention strategies to mitigate the impact of conflict and enhance resilience in areas vulnerable to conflict and instability.

Rice productivity and profitability in Myanmar: Assessment of the 2023 monsoon

We have analyzed rice productivity and profitability data for the 2023 monsoon season from the Myanmar Agriculture Performance Survey (MAPS), conducted at the beginning of 2024. This survey encompassed plots managed by 2,840 rice producers, distributed across all states/regions of the country. Our findings reveal:
1. National rice productivity exhibited an average increase of 7 percent during the 2023 monsoon compared to the previous year, reversing the decline witnessed in the 2022 monsoon. This year's heightened productivity primarily stems from increased input usage (particularly fertilizer), greater labor inputs (with more farmers adopting transplanting), and reduced occurrences of natural shocks, notably droughts.
2. The Ayeyarwady region, the country's principal rice-producing area, experienced an 11 percent increase in rice productivity. Conversely, rice yields remained low in Kayah and Chin, two states affected by severe conflict. The highest yields, along with notable increases over the past three years, are observed in Nay Pyi Taw.
3. Significant changes in input costs for rice cultivation were observed between the two seasons:
3.1 Prices of urea, the most important chemical fertilizer used by rice farmers, decreased by 16 percent.
3.2 Mechanization costs surged by a notable 42 percent, which is concerning, especially in light of escalating rural labor scarcity. Particularly pronounced increases in mechanization costs were noted in coastal areas where fuel prices were high, or fuel was not available at all.
4. Substantial changes in technology adoption and input utilization compared to the previous monsoon were noted:
4.1 Fertilizer use on rice increased by 20 percent.
4.2 Use of self-preserved seed – instead of obtaining it from the market - increased by 6 percentage points compared to last monsoon, and 17 percentage points compared to 2020.
4.3 Transplanting increased by 5 percentage points while broadcasting declined by 7 percentage points.
4.4 The use of combine harvesters on rice was 1 percentage point lower compared to last year but was 12 percentage points lower than in 2020.
5. Thirty percent of paddy farmers reported being impacted by climatic or other production shocks during this monsoon, with floods (reported by seven percent of farmers) and droughts (reported by five percent) having significant adverse effects on yields. When affected, paddy yields decreased by 32 and 51 percent, respectively. Incidences of pests, diseases, and weeds have the highest frequency overall (13 percent).
6. Substantial changes in input usage and technology adoption were observed in paddy cultivation within coastal areas (Rakhine and Tanintharyi), seemingly linked to insecurity, mobility constraints, and fuel accessibility issues:
6.1 Fertilizer use declined by one-third.
6.2 The utilization of combine harvesters plummeted by 26 percentage points.
7. Paddy prices at the farm level surged by 64 percent, reflecting changes in international rice prices as well as the depreciation of the MMK.
8. Real – in terms of the cost of an average food basket – profits from rice farming during the monsoon of 2023 increased by 43 percent compared to the previous year. While nominal profits doubled since the previous monsoon, high price inflation tempered the increase in real profits.
9. The paddy sector has proven resilient in 2023, with improved pricing incentivizing farmers to intensify production through increased usage of chemical fertilizers and labor inputs.

The outlook for paddy production in 2024 appears promising yet uncertain due to the following factors:
1. Weather conditions: Adverse weather, as witnessed during the 2023 monsoon, can significantly impact yields. Most models predict the El Niño conditions - with drier-than-average rainfall conditions - to continue weakening.
2. Evolution of insecurity: Insecurity correlates with reduced access to inputs and, when accessible, higher costs, thereby lowering profitability for farmers.
3. Labor scarcity: Labor availability is expected to become increasingly constrained in the next monsoon due to significant out-migration linked to the Military Service Law.
4. Fuel availability: A quarter of Myanmar's farmers reported limited access to fuel during the post/pre-monsoon season of 2024, complicating irrigation, and agricultural mechanization, which is typically relied upon by most rice farmers.

These findings underscore three primary implications for Myanmar's rice sector:
1. Ensuring adequate access to mechanization for rice farmers: Despite benefiting from increased mechanization over the past decade, there is a concerning trend of dis-adoption in combine harvester usage, attributed to mobility issues and fuel accessibility problems. This is particularly worrisome given the anticipated rise in rural labor scarcity.
2. Emphasizing access to climate-resilient seeds: While farmers are increasingly relying on self-preserved paddy seeds, there is a pressing need for the adoption of improved, high yielding, and stress-resistant varieties. As evidenced by our results, farmers affected by floods and droughts experience significantly lower yields than unaffected farmers. Given an expected increase of weather shocks, higher adoption of adapted seeds is required.
3. Addressing the impact of high rice prices on food security: While beneficial for farmers, elevated paddy prices contribute to high rice prices in the country, posing a significant concern, especially for the most vulnerable segments of the population.2 The most effective means of mitigating the adverse effects of high rice prices on poor consumers is through expanded safety net programs, providing additional liquidity directly to them.

Conflict, inclusivity, and transformation of the rice value chain in Myanmar

This study explores the transformation of Myanmar’s rice value chain (VC) over a period of liberalization, reform, and infrastructure expansion from 2013 to 2019, and over a period of multiple crises from 2020 to 2022 including a military coup and widespread conflict. We analyze modernization over these periods at different levels of the VC, including upstream (farms), midstream (mills), and downstream (rice vendors). We rely upon unique data from large-scale phone surveys collected at different segments of the rice value chain – including farm and post-farmgate – complemented with insights from key informant interviews, and secondary data. The major findings are the following:
1. There have been large transformations within the rice value chain over the last decade, but modernization in some areas decelerated due to conflict. We note a process of modernization, upscaling, quality improvements, and increased outsourcing of agricultural activities to specialized service providers by farmers. The majority of this transformation occurred during the period of relative stability from 2013 to 2019. We show that although modernization continued during the crisis years that followed, including an improvement in rice quality and an expansion of modern mills, many modernization processes decelerated. Mills and farms in insecure and conflict-affected areas participated to a lesser extent and the modernization gaps widened during the crisis years.
2. Local rice market conditions improved with better-quality rice sold locally. A large share of food vendors indicated better rice quality overall at the time of survey compared to 3 and 10 years earlier. Sixty-eight percent of vendors reported that there was no foreign matter in the rice that they sold a decade ago. That share has increased by 23 percentage points to 91 percent in 2022. In domestic retail, modern retail is (yet) negligible in rice distribution at the national level.
3. Rice exports quadrupled, with Myanmar becoming globally the 5th biggest exporter of rice by the end of 2019. Rice exports have proven to be resilient during the crisis years. Rice exports increased dramatically despite more stringent, and costly, non-tariff measures for exports such as phyto-sanitary requirements. Rice is exported through different channels, moving away from low-quality rice trucked to China, to relatively better-quality and often certified rice being shipped on large vessels to a more diverse set of countries. We see shifting challenges over time – due to banking, electricity, and mobility problems that millers and traders adjusted to, at an increasing cost – but national exports mostly stabilized, in the crisis years compared to the period before, seemingly as major rice producing areas - except Sagaing - were less affected by conflicts,
4. Midstream, we see rapid uptake and investments in modern drying machines – especially mechanized dryers – and modern milling machinery in the form of new mill starts and upgrading from traditional mills. The average number of modern mills operating in the miller’s same village tract/ward increased by about 60 percent from 2013 to 2019 and by a further 10 percent in 2022. The trend for traditional mills is the opposite: declining by 50 percent between 2013 and 2019 and a further 15 percent in 2022. This modernization has been driven by local firm investments as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been limited.
5. Upstream (at the farm level), we note a substantial expansion of modern input use. Rice seed markets have become more active in the 2010s. The sale of branded rice seeds doubled over the last decade. Chemical fertilizer use also increased over the last decade. While use was lower in 2022 than before the crisis, they were still at a higher level than a decade earlier. We also see increased use of modern harvest and post-harvest technologies and more outsourcing of harvest and post-harvest activities, mostly linked to these modern technologies and practices. In 2022, 54 percent of the farmers reported to have used a combine-harvester on most rice plots. Farmers hiring in tractors increased by 33 percentage points over the last decade. Outsourcing drying services has also increased, but the growth has been more modest: 22 percent of the farmers indicated that they outsourced the drying of paddy. Modern dryer use increased accordingly.
6. We find significant negative relationships between severe local conflict and many modernization outcomes. Severe conflict is found to negatively impact various modernization aspects, notably the adoption of tractor services and modern dryers at the farm level, and the prevalence of modern mills and drying equipment in midstream operations.
7. Modernization has not been everywhere inclusive. More remote and smaller firms are participating less in modern practices. More remote farmers show smaller growth in adoption of combine harvesters, modern dryers, and modern mills, while smaller farmers have smaller growth in the use of combine harvesters and drying service providers. In the midstream, mills in remote areas show smaller changes in the share of modern mills in their areas, while smaller mills have significantly slower growth in modern service provision and lower investment rates in value-added machinery. For many of these modernization outcomes, the gaps across firm size and remoteness widened during the crisis years.

Our findings point to three main implications for the modernization of Myanmar’s rice VC.
1. Private-market oriented reform leads to rapid modernization in VCs, while heavy intervention – e.g., low reference prices for rice; limits on intranational trade; control of imports and exports through an export licensing system; and currency manipulation through a dual exchange rate system – may jeopardize VC modernization and increase uncertainty throughout VCs.
2. More inclusive transformation should be promoted. Smaller and more remote farms and mills are showing slower growth across many modernization outcomes, raising concerns about livelihood improvements for those participating less in the VC’s modernization.
3. Conflict negatively affects modernization at the farm and VC midstream. The study reaffirms the crucial need for stable political and economic environments to foster effective agricultural growth and transformation.

Agricultural service delivery during turmoil: The state of agricultural extension and crop advisory services in Myanmar

Access to agricultural extension and crop advisory services can play a crucial role in ensuring widespread and appropriate use of new and improved agricultural technologies, but the delivery and use of such services is not well understood in Myanmar. We assess their use based on repeated large-scale and nationally representative farm surveys from 2020 onwards, as well as on insights from key informant interviews and secondary data. The major findings are the following:
1. Agricultural extension use is low and declining. Before the crisis years – due to COVID-19 and a military coup – agricultural extension provision and use in Myanmar was at much lower levels than in neighboring countries. There has been a further decline in use since. Forty-one percent of farmers reported to have received crop advice during the monsoon of 2020, but this share declined by 9 percentage points to 32 percent of farmers in the monsoon of 2022.
2. In-person agricultural extension is more widely used than digital extension. In the last dry season, 26 and 20 percent of the farmers relied on in-person and digital extension respectively.
3. The private sector is the main provider of in-person agricultural extension. During the last dry season, the main provider of in-person agricultural extension was the private sector (used by 18 percent of the farmers), followed by the public sector (13 percent of the farmers), and NGOs (6 percent). Previous seasons show similar shares.
4. In-person agricultural extension has been declining since 2020. In the last three years, there has been a significant decline in the provision of in-person extension services by all providers. In the case of the public sector in particular, the number of agricultural extension events in 2021/22 dropped by more than 50 percent compared to before the crisis years.
5. Digital agricultural extension service provision increased rapidly before 2020. Before the COVID-19 pandemic and the political crisis, the provision of digital extension services grew rapidly, linked to the rapid expansion of mobile cellphone networks and the spread of cheap smart phones. The total number of posts on Facebook by agricultural companies and organizations from July 2015 until November 2019 more than tripled. The biggest growth in posts was seen in 2018 and 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic.
6. Digital agricultural extension provision decreased immediately after the coup, but then expanded again in the years after. It was used by 20 percent of the farmers during the last dry season. Most users started using digital agricultural extension since the COVID-19 pandemic and the political crisis. After the initial drop in 2021 - as the use of Facebook was banned and as there were severe communication blockages - there has been an increase in activity since, and this has occurred despite the persistent communication and internet problems and reduced mobile network access in the country.
7. Digital agricultural extension is mostly provided through Facebook by agricultural input companies and social enterprises. The most widely used services are provided through Facebook pages, that for a number of organizations and companies have millions of followers. An analysis of the posts on these Facebook pages shows they contain more technical information than product advertisements, even so for (almost) all commercial input retail companies. We also recently note the establishment of farmer extension groups – a more interactive model – and specific commodity focused groups on Facebook. There are also groups on other online platforms, including specialized agricultural apps and call centers. However, these platforms are less used. Digital extension services are almost exclusively provided by the private sector, including social businesses.
8. Use of agricultural extension is non-inclusive, with less educated, more remote, female, and smaller farmers accessing them less, for digital as well as for in-person extension. We also note an important difference by age, with older farmers relying more on in-person services and younger ones more on digital extension.
9. Conflict-affected areas access agricultural extension services significantly less frequently. Farmers residing in townships under martial law – 13 percent of the townships – use any extension (in-person or digital) service less (8 percent compared to townships not under martial law, often because they lack access to the internet in these townships). While farmers residing in the most insecure areas use in-person extension less (11 percent less), they are however able to rely on digital services to a similar extent as farmers in the more secure townships.

The findings of the study have a number of important implications.
1. Scaling of digital extension. Given the widespread insecurity and mobility constraints in the country, limiting in-person travel, alternative digital opportunities have recently emerged that can provide crop advisory services at scale, and especially in some – but not all – of the conflict-affected areas. The scaling-up of such services would be very much welcomed, given that currently only one out of five farmers in Myanmar are relying on such services.
2. Leverage the experience of the private sector. The private sector is most active in agricultural extension, in-person and digital. It has been leading the pivot from in-person to the provision of digital services – not only focusing on sales of their products, but very much being involved in crop advice overall – providing important opportunities to work with these initiatives to finetune and extend the reach of agronomic and other advice for farmers, especially as a large share of farmers is not yet reached by current agricultural extension models.
3. Embrace innovations. Innovations in digital agriculture are quickly emerging - such as chatbots and A.I. - but are not yet being used to their fullest extent in Myanmar. Further piloting, testing, and evaluating the impact of such innovations should be encouraged.
4. Ensure internet access. Access to the internet is problematic in Myanmar – more than 40 percent of all households in Myanmar reported in a recent national survey that they never or only occasionally use the internet - and further efforts to ensure access, especially in conflict affected areas, as well as improve digital literacy should be encouraged.
5. Assess impact of agricultural extension. Despite the interest in the country, few rigorous assessments have been done on the impact of different modalities of extension on adoption of improved technologies and agricultural performance. This would be useful evidence to stimulate the scale-up of the most promising models.

Livelihoods and Welfare: Findings from the sixth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (June – November 2023)

The sixth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, was implemented between the end of August and November 2023. It follows five rounds that were carried out since the beginning of December 2021. This report discusses the findings from the sixth round related to livelihoods and welfare dynamics. The main findings are the following:
1. Nationally, median real household income per adult equivalent declined by 15 percent between late 2022 and late 2023, indicating that the purchasing power of household income declined substantially over the previous year. Between late 2022 and late 2023, median real income per adult equivalent earned from farm wages increased slightly while real income earned from all other sources stagnated or declined.
2. In late 2023, 13 percent of households had at least one jobless household member who in the three months before the survey spent at least one month seeking income generating work without finding it. The share of households with an unemployed member decreases by asset class (15 percent in asset poor households compared to 8 percent in asset rich households). Four percent of households had a child aged 5–11 who was employed at least one hour in any week in the three months before the survey and 8 percent of households had a child aged 12–14 who was employed at least 14 hours in any week during that period.
3. Between late 2022 and 2023, there has been an overall reduction in household engagement in income earning activities. Except for other income sources (e.g., rent, remittances, and other forms of assistance), the share of households engaged in each income generating activity either declined or increased by a small, statistically insignificant amount.
4. In every state/region, income poverty reached a new high in the period of August–November 2023 compared to all previous MHWS rounds in the last two years. Adjusted in accordance with food inflation, the poverty line increased by 35 percent between late 2022 and late 2023. A failure of nominal income to keep pace with this large jump in the poverty line led to an increase in the percentage of the population living in income-poor households by 17 percent from 62 percent in February–June 2023 to 72 in August–November 2023.
5. Casual wage earning households continue to be the poorest livelihood group with income poverty rates of 90 and 84 percent in farm and non-farm wage earning households, respectively. Nonetheless, income poverty rose to 63 and 67 percent in households whose primary livelihoods are non-farm salary work and non-farm businesses—23 and 17 percent higher than a similar period in the previous year. Finally, over the same period, income poverty increased by 11 percent in farm households to 69 percent.
6. Remittance income is an important stabilizing force. There are only a few factors helping households stay out of poverty, including earning income from salaried employment, migrating with the whole household, and receiving remittances. Individuals living in remittance receiving households are about 22 percentage points less poor compared to individuals in non-remittance receiving households. Households mainly reliant on ‘other’ forms of income, particularly remittances, are the most resilient livelihood group with poverty rates not changing between late 2022 and late 2023.
7. In late 2023, households in Chin, Kayah, Rakhine, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi struggled most of all regions/states with income poverty, unemployment, and challenges to earning income. During that period, poverty headcounts were 93 percent in Chin, 87 percent in Kayah; and around 80 percent in Rakhine, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi. In Kayah, 49 percent of households reported a loss of employment in June–November 2023, while in Tanintharyi 39 percent of households reported a loss of employment. Further, nearly 30 percent of households in Kayah had an unemployed member—more than double the national average. Chin and Rakhine also had a large share of households with unemployed members. Finally, households in Chin were nearly twice as likely as other parts of the country to have employed children—children aged 5–11 were employed in 7 percent of households and children aged 12–14 were employed in 15 percent of households.

Shocks and coping: Findings from the sixth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (June – November 2023)

The sixth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, was implemented between August and November 2023. It follows five rounds that were carried out since the beginning of December 2021. This report discusses the findings from the sixth round related to shocks and coping strategies. The security situation in Myanmar continued to deteriorate during the sixth-round recall period, which spanned from June to November 2023. Households felt insecure in their communities, as reported by 23 percent of households and had a low level of trust, as reported by 25 percent of households. This is because crime and violence continued to increase, affecting 20 and 10 percent of communities, respectively. Further, eight percent of households were directly affected by violence, either through violence against a household member, robbery, or appropriation and/or destruction of their assets. Lawlessness continues to rise in Myanmar. In June–November 2023, 21 percent of households reported a lot or some gambling in their community, 20 percent reported a high risk of burglary, theft, or robbery in their community, and 16 percent reported drug use. These issues were more prominent in urban areas, compared to rural areas. Another crucial challenge is that 15 percent of respondents felt that it was dangerous for them to move around and do everyday tasks in June–November 2023. Finally, three percent of respondents revealed that there was a risk of kidnapping in their community. The two states/regions where households felt the most insecure between June and November 2023 were Kayah and Chin. At the same time, the security situation in Rakhine, Tanintharyi, and Sagaing decreased the most compared to the same time last year. These areas witnessed the highest increases in lawlessness. While the lowest levels of reported insecurity continued to be in Ayeyarwady, Bago, and Nay Pyi Taw, these regions are still confronting much of the same risks as experienced across the country. Households faced multiple shocks besides insecurity. In June–November 2023, 19 percent of farm households reported being negatively impacted by at least one climatic shock. Intense wind was a major issue in Rakhine with 28 percent of households negatively impacted. Disruptions to the internet and electricity also negatively affected household wellbeing and livelihoods. For residents that accessed electricity from the national power grid, 55 percent of households had a power cut of at least one hour from 8:00 am to 8:00 pm all seven days of the week prior to the interview. Further, between June and November of 2023, almost half of the households (48 percent) did not have access to the internet regularly. Access to medical services and school enrolment improved at the end of 2023 compared to the end of 2022. The percentage of households who could never access medical services dropped from eight percent in July–December 2022 to two percent in June–November 2023. School enrollment improved from 79 percent of children aged 5 to 14 enrolled in July-December 2022 to 86 percent of children enrolled in June–November 2023. The rate of food inflation rose to 24 percent between March–June 2023 and September-November 2023, on average 5 percent per month. The prices of most foods in our survey increased considerably in the one-year period between October–December 2022 and September–November 2023, with median rice prices increasing by 75 percent. Further, the contribution of rice prices to the rising cost of the food inflation basket has become more 4 important over time. On the other hand, vegetable prices exhibited substantial volatility with large increases in prices between the third and fourth quarters of both 2022 and 2023. Seventy-five percent of households used at least one coping strategy to meet daily needs during the month prior to the sixth-round survey (June–November 2023). The three most common coping strategies used were spending savings, reducing non-food expenditure, and reducing food expenditure. This has been consistent across rounds. Further, some households exhausted some or all of their coping strategies. Thirty-five percent of households reported that they no longer have any savings to reduce. Finally, the number of households who borrowed money (30 percent) decreased significantly from the previous year (38 percent) but was still slightly higher than in the beginning of 2023. At the same time, 49 percent of households continued to be in debt.

Resilience pathways: Understanding remittance trends in post-coup Myanmar

Remittances have emerged as an important source of income for households in post-coup Myanmar. This paper utilizes data from the second and fifth rounds of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS) to analyze remittance trends between January and June 2022 and the same period in 2023. This is supplemented with data from the Myanmar Migration Assessment (MMA) which was conducted with a sub-sample of MHWS households in June and July 2023.

According to MHWS, between January and June 2023, 16 percent of households received remittances from at least one member who was residing overseas or in a different state or region. This comprises eight percent of households receiving remittances from migrants outside of Myanmar and ten percent of households receiving remittances from migrants within Myanmar. Around 12 percent of households received remittances from a single migrant and four percent of households received remittances from two or more members. Among households that received remittances from within Myanmar, they received on average 127,559 per month (about 61 USD). Households that received remittances from outside of Myanmar received around 395,835 per month (about 188 USD), significantly higher than the amount from migrants within Myanmar. Among remittance receiving households, remittances made up 39 percent of household income.

Based on MMA data, most foreign migrants reside in Thailand and Malaysia while most domestic migrants reside in Yangon, Mandalay, or Shan. During the twelve-month period between June 2022 and July 2023, over 57 percent of migrants in the MMA sent money back to their households in Myanmar. A greater percentage of overseas migrants sent remittances, compared to migrants within Myanmar. Mobile money was the most common method for migrants within Myanmar to send money, with 70 percent sending money in this way. Instead, most migrants abroad relied on Myanmar banks, 47 percent of migrants. More than half of the households surveyed received the same level of remittances in 2022/2023 as in the previous year. Households received more remittances when migrants earned higher salaries and obtained new jobs, or when the household witnessed shifts in exchange rates or faced an increased need for remittances. Conversely, households received fewer remittances when migrants grappled with elevated living expenses, received lower salaries, or remained unemployed.

The MMA data also highlights the remittance spending patterns of households over a five-year period from 2019 to 2023. About 75 percent of households allocated remittances to everyday food expenses. Remittances were also heavily used to cover non-food and health expenses, 41 and 36 percent, respectively. Asset-poor households, income poor households, and hungry households were more likely to spend remittances on everyday food and non-food expenses, education, and loan repayment. Compared to 2020, in 2023 households increased their remittance spending on home improvement, construction of new residences, and debt repayment. Combining MMA and MHWS data we investigate the characteristics associated with receiving remittances. Daughters of household heads are more likely to send remittances. Migrants with children are less likely to send remittances. Migrants aged younger than 18 are less likely to send remittances while migrants older than 40 are more likely to send remittances. Migrants with lower education are less likely to send remittances. Those migrating for employment and with work agreements are more likely to send remittances. Finally, remittances play a crucial role in improving household welfare. A final set of regressions reveal that receiving remittances is positively associated with key welfare indicators, including food security, dietary diversity, and poverty reduction.

Those who leave and those who stay: Individual migration in Myanmar during a time of crisis

Drawing on data from five rounds of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS) collected between December 2021 and June 2023 with more than 12,000 respondents per round, this report analyzes individual migration, migration in which one or a few household members leave the household. To complement this analysis, we utilize data from the Myanmar Migration Assessment, carried out in June and July 2023 in a sub-sample of MHWS households with household members who have migrated since 2013.

Over the year and a half period, from December 2021 to June 2023 an estimated 6,451,394 household members 15 and older, 11.8 percent of the population and 19.9 percent of the adult population, left their households. Kayah had the highest percentage of migrants, followed by Kachin, Kayin, and Mon, with migration rates over 25 percent of the adult population. Significantly more men migrated than women. Over the period, more individuals left for work within Myanmar than for overseas work or for other reasons including marriage, education, or to join family.

Using the Myanmar Migration Assessment sub-sample of 5,455 of individuals who have migrated since 2013, we analyze the migration process and destination characteristics. Most migrants in our sample only migrated once, 91 percent. Between 2021 and 2022, there was a huge jump in migration from 10 percent of the sample to 24 percent. Further, migration was already 23 percent of our sample in June 2023. Therefore, individual migration is likely to be much higher in 2023 than 2022. Between 2021 and 2023, most of the individual migration was internal, 79 percent versus 21 percent overseas. Internal migration and migration abroad are increasing at the same rate.

Most internal migration was to Yangon, followed by Mandalay, and Shan. Around 27 percent of all individuals migrated to Yangon over the whole period. Migration to Mandalay decreased from 2010 to 2023, while migration to Shan increased. Migration abroad is mainly to Thailand and Malaysia. Most individuals migrated to find better employment. Employment was the most important driver of migration across all years, all destinations, all age groups, and for men and women. In 2021-2023, 34 percent of individuals left their homes to find more work opportunities, 18 percent left their home to find a higher paid job, and 7 percent left to find better working conditions. At the same time, an increasing number of individuals migrated for education, as well.

In 2021-2023, 12 percent of migrants were household heads, most other migrants were either sons or daughters of the head. While between 2013 and 2016 only 44 percent of migrants had children when they migrated, in 2021-2023, 91 percent of migrants had children before they migrated. Overall, most migrants, regardless of their primary reason for migrating, had friends or relatives who had migrated to their destination before them, this includes 55 percent of internal migrants, and 58 percent of migrants abroad. Most migrants participated in most or all of the decisions to migrate. This was true for 85 percent of migrants that went abroad and 79 percent of migrants that remained within Myanmar. In Mandalay and Shan, fewer migrants fully participated in the decision to migrate.

Household migration during a time of crisis: Patterns and outcomes in Myanmar

This study analyzes household migration, including paths, causes, challenges, and post-migration outcomes in Myanmar between February 2021 and July 2023 using the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey and the Myanmar Migration Assessment. During this period, we find that approximately ten percent of households in Myanmar migrated as a household or family unit. While nearly 40 percent of migration was urban-to-urban, a quarter was rural-to-rural, a quarter was rural-to-urban, and ten percent was urban-to-rural.

Employment was the primary driver of household migration, with 54 percent of households citing it as their main reason for relocating. Other motivations included the desire to escape conflict and improve physical security (15 percent), to help family (12 percent), and for marriage (eight percent). In regions characterized by high conflict, such as Kayah, Chin, and Sagaing, a significant number of migrating households relocated due to conflict (70, 47, and 37 percent, respectively). Further, because of under-sampling of conflict areas, the number of migrants who moved due to conflict may be significantly higher.

Households from high conflict regions often moved more than once before reaching their current destination. Decisions on where to migrate were significantly influenced by perceptions of employment opportunities (35 percent) and safety considerations (34 percent). Finding the money to migrate was challenging for most households. Sixty-two percent of households relied on savings to finance migration, while 14 percent of households relied on assistance from relatives.

The study also analyzes post-migration outcomes. House ownership decreased significantly after migration from 65 percent to 28 percent. Instead, dwellings were either rented (34 percent) or stayed in for free (32 percent). Further, post-migration income sources changed. There was a significant increase in non-farm wage income and income from remittances and donations after the move. Almost two thirds of households reported improved safety and security conditions after the move. About half of the interviewed households felt that they had better opportunities to earn an income after moving. Nevertheless, access to furniture, clothing, and cooking materials decreased for a third of the households (35, 27, and 29 percent, respectively). Moreover, there were notable disparities between households migrating due to conflict and households who moved for other reasons, including less access to income, furniture, clothing, and cooking materials after the move for households displaced due to conflict.

Oilseed crop production: Findings from the Myanmar Agriculture Performance Survey

Groundnut, sesame, soybean, and sunflower crops are grown across Myanmar. Nationally, 15 percent of farmers were engaged in oilseed cultivation in the post/pre-monsoon 2023 season, while 17 percent of farmers planted oilseeds in the 2022 monsoon season. Among the agro-ecological zones, the Dry Zone had the largest share of farmers growing oilseeds as their most important non-paddy crop. At the same time, the percentage of farmers who grew oilseeds as their most important non-paddy crop in 2023 declined overall and in the Dry Zone compared to the post/pre monsoon seasons of 2022 and 2021. In the post/pre-monsoon 2023 season, 7 and 6 percent of the farmers grew sesame and groundnut, respectively. Only 2 percent of farmers grew soybeans while 1 percent grew sunflowers. Groundnut, sunflower, and sesame were mainly grown in the Dry Zone, while soybean was mainly grown in the Hills and Mountainous Region. The farm size of oilseed growing households was slightly larger than that of the average crop growing household, 5.7 acres compared with 4.7 acres. Most oilseed farmers specialize in oilseed production and plant more than half of their cultivated acres to oilseeds. Oilseed farmers grew oilseeds on 64 percent of their cultivated acres in the 2023 pre/post monsoon season and 36 percent of their cultivated acres in the monsoon season.

The state of food security and Nutrition in Myanmar 2022-23: Findings from six rounds of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey

This working paper explores the state of food security and nutrition in Myanmar using 6 rounds of nationally representative household panel data collected from December 2021 to November 2023. Overall, the state of food security and nutrition has deteriorated in Myanmar in 2022-23. More than 3 percent of households were in moderate to severe hunger in September-November 2023. Hunger was highest in Chin (8.7 percent) and Tanintharyi (7.0 percent). Households with a low food consumption score increased from 9.4 percent in December 2021-February 2022 to 15.9 percent in October-December 2022 and remained high at 14.4 percent in September-November 2023. The shares in September-November 2023 were highest in Chin (38.2 percent), Kayah (22.4 percent), and Magway (20 percent). Inadequate diet diversity among adults rose from 20.6 percent to 30.9 percent over December 2021-February 2022 to October-December 2022, with an increase of 5.9 percentage points in the past one year. Women saw a faster decline in diet quality from December-February 2022 to September-November 2023 (12.1 percentage points increase in poor diet quality vs 8.4 percentage points for men). Decreases in diet quality among adults are driven by lower consumption of milk and dairy products as well as Vitamin A rich fruits, meat, fish, and eggs. 34.5 percent of all children aged 6-23 months and nearly a quarter (23.6 percent) of all children aged 6-59 months had inadequate diet quality in the latest round of survey. Regression analysis reveals low income and limited assets to be important risk factors for food security and adequate diet quality. Wage workers and low wage communities are found to be particularly vulnerable. Rising food prices, conflict and physical insecurity increase the likelihood of poor diet quality. Receiving remittances is a source of resilience; remittance-receiving households are less likely to experience hunger or poor dietary diversity at the household, adult, and child level. To avert a full-blown nutrition crisis in Myanmar, effective multisectoral steps are required to protect nutritionally vulnerable populations. Expanded implementation of nutrition- and gender sensitive social protection programs, including maternal and child cash transfers, particularly to vulnerable groups is called for. Further, given the importance of remittances as an effective coping mechanism, supporting migration and the flow of remittances would help to improve the welfare of the Myanmar population.

Traders and agri-food value chain resilience: The case of maize in Myanmar

Myanmar has experienced a sequence of dire crises beginning in 2019 including the unexpected closure of a principal trade route, COVID-19 lockdowns and travel restrictions, and a military coup leading to years of disruptions in the banking and transport sectors, inflation, and conflict. Yet, through these cascading shocks Myanmar’s maize sector experienced robust growth in production and exports. This paper examines the reasons underlying this apparent paradox and our findings contribute to the small but growing literatures on agri-food value chain (AVC) resilience and adaptation by traders. Strengthening the resilience of AVCs to shocks has important implications for welfare in developing countries and is increasingly drawing attention from policymakers and development partners. Using data from several sources including rare panel data sets of traders and farmers, and key informant interviews, we show that crop traders have been critical to the resilience of the maize value chain in Myanmar during this turbulent period. Maize traders performed three key functions contributing to resilience: (i) market discovery when primary trade routes were closed; (ii) overcoming transportation disruptions and bank closures to move maize from the farmgate to local and export markets; (iii) maintaining flows of credit to farmers throughout the crises in the form of selling inputs on credit and lending cash, thereby injecting much needed liquidity at times of incredible uncertainty, disruptions in the banking sector, and rising input prices.

The state of food security and nutrition in Myanmar 2022-23: Findings from five rounds of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey

This working paper explores the state of food security and nutrition in Myanmar using 5 rounds of nationally representative household panel data collected from December 2021 to June 2023. Overall, the state of food security and nutrition has deteriorated in Myanmar in 2022-23. More than 3 percent of households were in moderate to severe hunger in April-June 2023. Hunger was highest in Chin (10.1 percent), Rakhine (7.6 percent), and Kayin (5.9 percent). Households with a low food consumption score increased from 9.4 percent in December 2021-February 2022 to 17.7 percent in April-June 2023. The shares in April-June were highest in Chin (48.4 percent), Kayah (27 percent), and Kachin (22 percent). Inadequate diet diversity among adults rose from 20.6 percent to 27.1 percent over the same period. Women saw a faster decline in diet quality from December-February 2022 to April-June 2022 (9.1 percentage points increase in poor diet quality vs 3.8 percentage points for men). Decreases in diet quality among adults are driven by lower consumption of milk and dairy products as well as Vitamin A rich fruits, meat, fish, and eggs. 40 percent of all children aged 6-23 months and nearly a quarter (24.9 percent) of children aged 6-59 months had inadequate diet quality in the latest round of survey. Regression analysis reveals low income and limited assets to be important risk factors for food security and adequate diet quality. Wage workers and low wage communities are found to be particularly vulnerable. Rising food prices, conflict and physical insecurity increase the likelihood of poor diet quality. Receiving remittances is a source of resilience; remittance-receiving households are less likely to experience hunger or poor dietary diversity at the household, adult, and child level. To avert a full-blown nutrition crisis in Myanmar, effective multisectoral steps are required to protect nutritionally vulnerable populations. Expanded implementation of nutrition- and gender-sensitive social protection programs, including maternal and child cash transfers, particularly to vulnerable groups is called for. Further, given the importance of remittances as an effective coping mechanism, supporting migration and the flow of remittances would help to improve the welfare of the Myanmar population.

Vulnerability and welfare: Findings from the fifth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (March – June 2023)

The fifth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, was implemented between March and June 2023. It follows from four rounds that were carried out quarterly beginning in December 2021. This report discusses the findings from the fifth round related to livelihoods, shocks, asset and income poverty, and coping strategies.

The continuous rise - during economic growth, the COVID-19 Pandemic, and conflict - in the adoption of labor-saving agricultural technologies in Myanmar: Evidence and implications

After decades of isolationism and economic stagnation, Myanmar opened its economy in the beginning of the 2010s, leading to rapid economic growth (Myanmar’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was almost 50 percent larger in 2020 than in 2011). But the COVID-19 health crisis that started in 2020 and a military coup in the beginning of 2021 – and the subsequent increase in conflicts, forced displacements, and migration – dramatically reversed that outlook, with Myanmar’s GDP in 2022 estimated to be 13 percent smaller than three years earlier. The agricultural sector also changed accordingly during this period.

Livelihood resilience and the agrifood system in Myanmar: Implications for agriculture and a rural development strategy in a time of crisis

Myanmar’s agrifood system has proven surprisingly resilient in the face of multiple crises—COVID 19, the military coup, economic mismanagement, global price instability, and widespread conflict—with respect to production and exports. Household welfare has not been resilient, however. High rates of inflation, especially food price inflation, have resulted in dietary degradation across all house hold groups, especially those dependent on casual wage labor. Among household members, young children experience the highest rates of inadequate dietary quality. Expanded social protection to improve access to better-quality diets for vulnerable households and individuals is therefore needed. Beyond the current political crisis, increased public and private investment in a more efficient and dynamic agrifood system should be a high priority. This will help drive down poverty rates and ensure access to healthy diets in the near term, while laying the foundation for sustained growth and struc tural transformation of the economy.

Myanmar’s livestock sector: An overview of production and consumption in 2022

The poultry and pig production subsectors are facing significant financial stress, primarily due to a combination of increasing production costs and declining consumer demand. Among the challenges reported by livestock raisers, the most frequent ones were sickness or death of animals, followed closely by high input prices. The cost of production for poultry and swine doubled over a two-year period, largely driven by rising feed and other input costs. Specifically, the price of 50 kg of broiler chicken feed increased by 61 percent between 2021 and 2022, while the price of 30 kg of pig feed increased by 51 percent during the same period. These significant cost increases have led to a notable decrease in livestock income in real terms. Moreover, the triple crisis has affected consumption patterns, with households reducing their expenditure on food, particularly animal-sourced food. As a result, livestock consumption has also decreased, adding to the challenges faced by the livestock industry. In our sample, we found that 44 percent of households were involved in livestock raising, with 33 percent of households earning income from this activity. However, it's concerning that 18 percent of these households had to resort to selling livestock as a coping strategy to meet their daily needs rather than as a deliberate business decision. This paper presents a comprehensive overview of the Myanmar livestock sector during the period from September 2021 to August 2022. It delves into various aspects, starting with livestock production, examining the challenges faced by farmers, production costs, and income. Additionally, the study analyzes the trends in animal-sourced food consumption in Myanmar. Finally, the paper discusses the critical issues and challenges that the sector is likely to encounter and proposes several recommended actions.

Pulses sector assessment: Pre- and post-monsoon 2021 and 2022

The pulse sector in Myanmar has emerged as a crucial income source for farmers during the triple crisis, driven by increased export demand and domestic consumption, as well as reduced production costs and irrigation requirements. However, pulse growers still face several challenges, including escalating fertilizer prices, conflict, border closures, and inadequate government support in terms of credit and extension services. This working paper focuses on assessing the performance and competitiveness of the pulse sector during the pre/post monsoon growing seasons of 2021 and 2022. The analysis is based on recall data obtained from the Myanmar Agricultural Performance Survey (MAPS), conducted between August 2022 and September 2022.

Urban proximity, conflict, and agricultural development: Evidence from Myanmar

Urbanization and violent conflict have been two global trends gaining more and more momentum in recent years. This has important implications for agricultural development, which unfortunately are still not well understood. Urban proximity is generally associated with agricultural intensification and improved market participation, while farming systems in remote areas are characterized by larger shares of subsistence production. Such differences along the remoteness gradient likely also play a role in how conflict exposure affects agricultural production. That is, we must assume that the effect of conflict on agricultural development is location-dependent—a fact that is generally neglected in empirical analysis. We address this gap by drawing from a unique nationally representative data set of 2,292 paddy farmers in Myanmar and estimating the effect of conflict exposure and travel times on agricultural production during the monsoon season of 2021. By applying multivariate additive models, we allow for nonlinear and interacted effects of conflict exposure and urban proximity, thereby explicitly exploring spatial variation in the effect of conflict exposure. We find strong positive effects of urban proximity on paddy rice intensification and sales, while conflict exposure has disproportionately negative effects in direct proximity to urban centers and very remote areas. For agricultural development—and smallholder incomes in general—this means that productive areas, on the one hand, and the poorest areas of the country, on the other hand, are especially affected by conflict.

Remittances and household welfare: Findings from the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS)

Remittances are a critical source of household income in Myanmar and are significantly associated with positive welfare outcomes. In 2022, 33 percent of the households surveyed in the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS) received remittances at least once in the twelve-month period. Remittances made up 7 percent of the average monthly per capita income of households in 2022. Among households that received remittances, 40 percent of their average monthly per capita income was from remittances. Considerably more households received remittances in 2022, compared to 2017, the last year for which there is nationally representative data (World Bank 2017). Despite the increase in the number of households receiving remittances, compared to 2017, the income share from remittances has decreased for all households. Even with internal lockdowns and border closures because of the COVID-19 pandemic, remittance senders migrated internally in 2020 and 2021. As a result, domestic remittance flows appear to have increased steadily since 2012. International remittance flows, on the other hand, decreased substantially during the first two years of the pandemic. They are now increasing rapidly. In 2022, households in Rakhine, Chin, Mon, and Kayin received the most remittances of the states/regions. Households in Chin, Kayin, Tanintharyi, and Mon received a greater percentage of remittances from international senders rather than domestic senders. Most international remittance flows were from Thailand, Malaysia, and China. Households in Kachin, Ayeyarwady, and Mandalay received the most remittances from domestic senders. Most domestic remittance flows were from Yangon, Mandalay, and Shan. Receiving remittances has a positive and significant association with improved welfare outcomes. Households that receive remittances are less likely to have lower income compared with last year and more likely to have a better food consumption score and a higher dietary diversity score. Households who receive remittances use fewer coping strategies. Finally, households who receive remittances are more likely to have an improved house made of brick, brick/wood, or semi-pucca.

How happy are you? It depends on when asked …

Subjective well-being measures are increasingly applied in quantitative economic analyses intended to elicit non-monetary wellbeing of individuals. However, the subjective nature of this evaluation means that measurement and comparison may be confounded by differences in context or may be sensitive to the implementation modality. We use two rounds of a large-scale panel phone survey data from Myanmar to explore whether the randomized placement of a happiness module – either at the beginning or at the end of the survey – affects respondents’ answers. Respondents who were asked the happiness module at the end are more likely to be happy – an increase of 7 percentage points – compared to those who are asked at the beginning of the survey. This result is consistent using different models and robust to inclusion of enumerator fixed effects and other enumerator and survey characteristics. A related question on worry in the same module yields similar findings. Results also sustain over the two rounds of survey in which we conducted the experiment.

Agricultural extension in times of crisis and emergent threats: Effectiveness of a fall armyworm information intervention in Myanmar

Agricultural extension can have important impacts on vulnerable populations by increasing food production, which improves both rural incomes and urban food security. Yet, crises induced by violent conflict or disease outbreaks can sever the connections between extension agents and farmers. Understanding how agricultural extension systems can safely and effectively reach farmers in times of crisis could help stabilize agri-food systems in fragile states. In the context of COVID-19, a military coup, and an emergent threat of fall armyworm in Myanmar, this paper uses a randomized controlled trial to test the effectiveness of two cellphone-based extension interventions – a direct-to-farmer and a lead farmer intervention – for fall armyworm control in maize. Despite low compliance, both interventions caused knowledge improvements. However, damage control estimates show that the lead-farmer group used pesticides most effectively. Similar cellphone-based lead-farmer programs could be an effective tool in fragile states and when faced with emergent threats to agriculture.

Paddy rice productivity and profitability in Myanmar: Assessment of the 2022 monsoon season

We analyze paddy rice productivity and profitability data for the monsoon season of 2022 from the Myanmar Agriculture Performance Survey (MAPS), fielded in the beginning of 2023. The survey covered plots of 3,076 paddy rice producers, spread across all states/regions of the country. We find that: 1. Paddy rice productivity – tons of paddy produced per unit of cultivated land – at the national level decreased on average by 7.5 percent during the monsoon of 2022 compared to the monsoon of 2021. The lower productivity is mostly explained by adverse weather conditions, with negative impacts of droughts during the monsoon of 2022. Lower input use and other factors - such as increased insecurity - played an important role as well. Paddy rice yields were lowest in Kayah and Chin, two conflict-affected states. 2. Prices for most inputs used in paddy rice cultivation increased significantly between these two seasons. Prices of urea, the most important chemical fertilizer used by paddy rice farmers, increased by 87 percent on average while mechanization costs increased by 27 percent. Small decreases are noted, on average, in the use of paddy rice inputs over the last two monsoons. Despite the large price increases for chemical fertilizer, its use declined only by 8 percent compared to the previous monsoon. 3. Paddy prices at the farm level increased by 81 percent, reflecting changes in international rice prices as well as the depreciation of the MMK. Gross revenues per acre increased in nominal terms by 67 percent, mostly due to these high price increases. 4. Real profits, with nominal prices corrected by the change in the cost of an average food basket, from paddy rice farming during the monsoon of 2022 increased by 26 percent and 10 percent compared to the monsoon of 2021 and 2020 respectively. While nominal profits for paddy rice farmers increased by 95 percent over the last two seasons, price inflation has been high in the country and real profit increased much less. While the rice sector demonstrated resilience in the country, the current situation is concerning given productivity declines and high price increases, raising fears for increased food insecurity in the country. We have found improved farm profitability this year and as fertilizer prices for the coming monsoon (the monsoon of 2023) are down (due to international price decreases) and international rice prices are up (due to lower global stocks), this might further improve profitability - and incentives - for paddy production in 2023. These price developments might possibly reverse the declining productivity trend. The big unknowns that might impact paddy production in 2023 though are the weather - with less rainfall expected due to El Niño conditions in the second half of the year - and the evolution of conflict-related insecurity in the country.

Agricultural mechanization services, rice productivity, and farm/plot size: Insights from Myanmar

The relationship between productivity and farm size has been at the center of considerable debate. Agricultural mechanization – that is rapidly taking off in a large number of low- and middle-income countries – has been identified as one of the emerging technologies in these settings with a critical, yet complex, influence on this productivity-size relation. However, knowledge gaps remain as how agricultural transformation due to the adoption of new technologies and the change in factor costs, such as mechanization fees, are associated with this productivity - size relation. In the case of Myanmar, where mechanization use has dramatically increased over the last decade, we find a significant inverse productivity - plot size relationship, with small rice plots having productivity levels approximately 30 percent higher than large plots. However, rising mechanization fees – more so in conflict-affected townships – attenuated this inverse relation between rice productivity (yield and profit per land) and plot size substantially. These results primarily hold on the largest rice plot cultivated by each farmer, but also generally hold when comparing total rice area and major non-rice area. Our results are likely explained by the fact that, in Myanmar, smallholders have become more dependent on mechanization services than larger farms (who can rely on their own machines) do, that alternatives to mechanization services have become scarce (as mechanization use changed little, despite these price increases), and that mechanization service costs account for a significant share of the total production costs among smallholders.

Vulnerability and welfare: Findings from the fourth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (October to December 2022)

The fourth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, was implemented between October and December 2022. It follows from three rounds that were carried out quarterly beginning in December 2021. This report discusses the findings from the fourth round related to shocks, coping strategies, and income poverty. The security situation in Myanmar continued to deteriorate during the fourth-round recall period. Increasingly, households felt insecure in their communities, as reported by 22 percent of rural households and 27 percent of urban households, an increase compared to the previous rounds. This is because crime and violence continued to increase, affecting 12 and 8 percent of communities, respectively. Further, 8 percent of households were directly affected, either through violence against a household member, robbery, or appropriation and/or destruction of their assets. Households faced multiple disruptions besides insecurity. Disruptions in banking, internet, and electricity also negatively affected household wellbeing and livelihoods. Further, households struggled to receive medical services. Finally, while school attendance recovered, it was still under 70 percent in some states/regions. Eighty-four percent of households used at least one coping strategy to meet daily needs during the month prior to the fourth-round survey. The three most common coping strategies used were spending savings, reducing non-food expenditure, and reducing food expenditure. This has been consistent across rounds. Further, some households exhausted some or all of their coping strategies. Remittances were the only factor inversely associated with households’ probability of having lower income compared to last year, being income poor, and using coping strategies. In R4 income-based poverty increased by 30 percent compared to R1 (15 percentage points) and 7 percent compared to R3 (4 percentage points). Sixty-six percent of the population was income poor. The rise in income poverty between R3 and R4 was largely attributable to changes in urban poverty. Casual wage-earning households, both farm and non-farm, had the highest levels of income poverty. Compared to the other states/regions, households in Kayah, Chin, and Sagaing were the most vulnerable. They were more likely to be impacted by conflict, have income loss, and be income poor. Despite reporting comparatively less conflict, households in Rakhine were also vulnerable; nearly 80 percent of households in Rakhine were income poor and many were mortgaging/selling assets to cope.

An overview of migration in Myanmar: Findings from the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey

This paper provides evidence on the extent and characteristics of migration in Myanmar between December 2021 and June 2022. We use data from three rounds of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, to analyze migration patterns in Myanmar. The data highlights a complex situation, where there is both new migration, that is driven by conflict, and more traditional migration, that is driven by a search for better employment both within Myanmar and abroad. We find that approximately 3.6 million individuals or 6.5 percent of the population of Myanmar moved over the 6-month study period. Between December 2021 and June 2022 fleeing direct conflict was the primary driver of migration for as many as 604 thousand individuals. During the same period, approximately 2 million individuals moved in search of a job for themselves or a family member. Finally, Chin, Yangon, and Rakhine had the highest rates of migration.

Regional variations and trends in the composition and vulnerability of rural livelihoods

The regional context in which rural livelihoods in Myanmar are embedded varies widely, in terms of physical geography, climate and agroecology, local resource base, agrarian structure, infrastructure provision, proximity to urban areas and neighboring countries, social networks, institutions, and ethnicities. The composition of livelihoods in each administrative and geographical zone of the country reflects these diverse contexts. Marked variations in patterns of livelihoods are evident at multiple scales, from the zone or region, down to township, and village level, so that the composition of livelihoods in villages close to one another sometimes varies widely (Phyo, 2022). Despite a high level of place-based specificity, many broad similarities and common trends also shape the composition of livelihoods at sub-national and national levels. These include: Generally low levels of agricultural productivity relative to other countries in the region, in terms of both land and labor (World Bank 2016); High rates of landlessness and legacies of land confiscation and unresolved struggles over land rights and access (Mark and Belton 2020); Generally poor, though -prior to 2020 - rapidly improving, public infrastructure and services, including electricity, roads, schools, health services, and rural credit (Belton et al. 2017; Lambrecht and Belton 2018); Relatively low levels of diversification and capital in the rural non-farm economy; High rates of international and domestic outmigration (World Bank and LIFT 2016; CHIME 2019); Histories of ethno-political conflict and insecurity (South 2009). This working paper synthesizes analyses from four large household surveys, each covering a major agro-ecological zone, to evaluate inter-regional variations in the composition of livelihoods and the rural economy. The four zones examined are the Delta (Ayeyarwady and Yangon), the Dry Zone (Mandalay, Magway, Sagaing), the hills (represented by Shan South), and the coasts (represented by Mon State). We also synthesize recent secondary sources that offer additional context and insights on regional livelihood dynamics from these and other areas of Myanmar, including the impacts of the ‘triple crisis’ (covid, coup, and price inflation) beginning in 2020.

Conflict and agricultural productivity: Evidence from Myanmar

Evidence is scarce on how conflict affects technology adoption and consequent agricultural productivity in fragile states, an important topic given the high share of the extreme poor living in fragile environments globally. Our study contributes to filling this knowledge gap by using unique large-scale data on rice producers in Myanmar before and after a military coup in 2021, leading to a surge of conflicts in the country. We find that the increase in violent events significantly changed rice productivity. Specifically, increases in fatal violent events between 2020 and 2021 reduced rice Total Factor Productivity (TFP) – a measure of how efficiently agricultural inputs are used to produce rice – by about 4 percent on average in the short-run. Moreover, poorer farmers are more affected by conflict, as seen through an increased output elasticity to agricultural equipment owned, indicating reduced output resilience for less-capital owning, and therefore poorer, farmers. This seems partly due to reduced access to agricultural extension services, which would otherwise help farmers maintain productivity, even with limited capital ownership, through substitution with human capital and skills. Lower mechanization service fees partly mitigate these effects. Our results consistently hold for both short- and long-run production functions, across various specifications, and in Upper and Lower Myanmar. These findings suggest that containing and reducing violent events is critical in restoring rice productivity. Improved access to extension services, as well as to cheap mechanization service provision to mitigate lack of equipment ownership, could compensate for these losses and boost the productivity of farmers, especially for those with less production capital, in such fragile settings.

Dietary quality and nutrition in Myanmar: Past progress, current and future challenges

In the decade prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Myanmar was in the midst of a dietary transition driven by rapid economic growth and urbanization. In this study, we first use national survey data to compare household diets in 2015 to the healthy diet recommendations of food-based dietary guidelines adapted for Myanmar, as well as estimated nutrient consumption relative to recommended intakes. We use these food group and nutrient consumption gaps to estimate a new measure of multidimensional dietary deprivation developed by Pauw et al. (2022), and a novel extension of that index to nutrient deprivation. Both deprivation indices are strongly negatively correlated with total household expenditure. We then use food demand estimation to estimate income and own price elasticities, which reveal strong preferences for animal-sourced foods, but weaker preferences for vegetables and pulses. Expenditure data also point to strong demand for oils/fats – a problem observed throughout developing Asia (Pingali and Abraham 2022) – and for food away from home, which partially explains the rising burden of overweight/obesity in Myanmar. Moreover, since most nutrient-dense foods are income- and price-elastic, estimated income elasticities suggest that recent declines in household income and increases in food prices in Myanmar will result in declining dietary diversity. We show that this is indeed the case utilizing household phone surveys conducted in recent years. We first use a food vendor survey to show that the cost of a healthy diet increased by 61 percent between September 2021 and September 2022. Next, we analyze a rural Dry Zone panel survey implemented 10 times over 2020-2021 and find that maternal and child dietary diversity both declined significantly as Myanmar’s economic situation deteriorated. Then, in a nationally representative phone survey conducted quarterly in 2022 over a period of rapid food inflation, we find further deterioration in diet quality among adults, but no deterioration among children 6-23 months of age, suggesting parents may be trying to insulate their children from the worst effects of the crisis. Finally, we conclude the paper by discussing policy and program options in very difficult political circumstances. Malnutrition is a multidimensional problem requiring multisectoral solutions, but at present the breakdown in the provision of even basic services makes significant progress highly unlikely, and reversing the recent deterioration in dietary quality and nutrition will surely require resolution of Myanmar’s political crisis. In the interim, we discuss three potentially effective types of interventions: (1) rice fortification to reduce micronutrient deficiencies; (2) homestead food production to improve dietary quality in farm households and rural and peri-urban communities; and (3) nutrition-sensitive social protection for vulnerable mothers and young children, with transfers ideally accompanied by nutrition education interventions.

The stalled transformation of food processing in Myanmar

We assess the status and effects of the twin crises (COVID-19 and the military coup) on different segments (production, trade, and consumption) of Myanmar’s food processing sector. Since 2020, we note overall a stalled transformation in food processing in the country: 1. Production (post-farm): The food-processing sector – and especially rice milling – is shown to be very important, making up more than 80 percent of the revenue and value addition of the local industrial sector. The sector suffered substantially from the twin crises, as seen by reduced output and limited new investments in the two most recent years. 2. International trade: Myanmar is in most years a net agricultural exporter (in value terms). However, food exports are dominated by unprocessed and minimally processed products while food imports are mostly more expensive processed foods. While there was fast growth in international food trade between 2009 and 2019, new central bank regulations – focused on an import-substitution strategy to mitigate foreign exchange constraints – have altered trade substantially since. 3. Consumption: The categories of unprocessed and especially of minimally processed food products represent 64 and 23 percent of calories and food expenditures respectively, reflecting the importance of rice in Myanmar’s food economy. After the twin crises, the value of food consumption significantly decreased by 30 and 36 percent for rural and urban areas respectively between 2020 and 2022. However, consumption levels for rural residents are still lower after the crises than those of urban ones. Moreover, while real food consumption expenditures declined significantly for all income groups, the poorest suffered most from the crises as seen in the higher reduction of expenditures for the poorest quintiles (by 31 and 39 percent in rural and urban areas respectively).

Income diversification and the rural non-farm economy

This paper empirically investigates the role of off-farm and non-agricultural activities in Myanmar’s rural sector, based primarily on the nationally representative MLCS 2016/17. We find evidence of extensive diversification: rural households are generating about 25 percent of their income on the farm; the remaining income comes from wage labor (34 percent), non-agricultural businesses (27 percent), and about 15 percent from passive sources (remittances and others). More than half of rural households engage in non-farm activities. Despite this large participation, the non-farm sector is informal and has yet to reach its full job-creating potential. Diversification is broad-reaching, and prevalent at all levels of income; however, wealthier households participate more heavily in the non-farm sector. Land constraints, household size, education levels, and gender all appear correlated with households’ propensity to diversify. Since the start of the twin crises, we continue to see significant diversification in rural incomes and all sectors – farm and non-farm – suffering very similar income shocks.

Vulnerability and welfare: Findings from the third round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (July and August 2022)

The third round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, was implemented between July and August 2022. It followed from a second round that was conducted between April and June 2022 and a first round that was carried out between December 2021 and February 2022. This report discusses the findings from the third round related to shocks, coping strategies, and income poverty. During the third round of data collection, the security situation in Myanmar continued to decline. Increasingly, households felt insecure in their communities, as reported by 21 percent of rural households and 25 percent of urban households, an increase compared to previous rounds. This is because crime and violence continued to increase, affecting 10 and 8 percent of communities, respectively. Further, 6 percent of households were directly affected, either through violence against a household member, robbery, or appropriation and/or destruction of their assets. Households also continued to earn less income. In July and August of 2022, 46 percent of households reported lower income compared to the previous year. Disruptions in banking, internet, and electricity also negatively impact household wellbeing and livelihoods. Further, households struggled to receive medical services. Finally, while school attendance recovered, it was still under 50 percent in some states/regions. Eighty-two percent of households used at least one coping strategy to meet daily needs during the month prior to the third-round survey. The three most common coping strategies used were spending savings, reducing non-food expenditure, and reducing food expenditure. Further, some households exhausted some or all of their coping strategies. Finally, income poverty increased during the third round; 62 percent of households were income poor. Casual wage earning and asset poor households were particularly vulnerable. Compared to the other states/regions, households in Kayah and Chin were the most vulnerable. They were more likely to be impacted by conflict, have income loss, and be income poor. Households in Rakhine, Kachin, and Tanintharyi were also vulnerable; more than 70 percent of households in those regions were income poor.

Welfare and vulnerability: Findings from the second round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (April – June 2022)

The second round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, was implemented between April and June 2022. It follows from a first round that was carried out between December 2021 and February 2022. This report discusses the findings from the second round related to shocks, livelihoods, coping strategies and food security. We find that 19.6 percent of households reported security and climatic shocks in the three months prior to their interview. Further, there is an uptick in reported crime, violence, and insecurity across communities in the second round, compared with the first. Theft is also an important issue, with 3.2 percent of households burglarized. Fifty-five percent of households report a lower income in the beginning of 2022 compared to 12 months earlier. Eighty-three percent of households use at least one coping strategy to meet daily needs during the month prior to the survey. The three most common copying strategies are spending savings, reducing nonfood expenditure, and reducing food expenditure. Seventeen percent of households have poor or borderline food consumption, more than in round one (R1), when the share was 9.4 percent. This change is in part driven by a decrease in animal-sourced food consumption, from 5.0 days a week in R1, to 3.9 days a week in round two (R2). Finally, hunger is an issue for 4.0 percent of households. Regression analysis reveals that self-reported community insecurity and climatic shocks are strongly associated with negative outcomes for income, coping, and food security. Finally, households in Kayah and Chin are the most vulnerable; they report insecurity, violence, and crime in their communities and compared to the other states/regions are more likely to have income loss, poor food consumption and hunger.

Farm commercialization in Myanmar: A transformation on hold or in reverse?

Over the last decade, farms in Myanmar have gone through important market transitions. On the input side, imports of chemical fertilizer increased four-fold and agro-chemicals eight-fold while 55 percent more farmers were using mechanization rental services between 2011 and 2020. On the output side, three-quarters of Myanmar’s crop production is sold, indicating high market orientation, especially so for non-paddy crops. However, farm commercialization in Myanmar started from a low base and is still lagging peer countries in the region. The twin crises in 2020 and 2021 (the covid-19 and the political crisis) and international market developments have further led to increasing worries for an agricultural market transformation on hold or in reverse, as seen by a decline in imports of modern inputs, driven by price increases of inputs, currency policy changes, insecurity, and reduced profitability for most crop farmers. To improve farm commercialization and to catch up with peers, a better and secure business environment, openness to trade, further diversification, and improved infrastructure is called for.

Agricultural land and crop production in Myanmar

Southeast Asia’s agricultural landscape is known for rice production in lowland areas, diverse upland areas, and the cultivation of ‘boom crops’ in the borderlands. Despite general similarities across different Southeast Asian countries, each has its own distinct history and patterns of land use, access, and ownership. However, little is documented, particularly for Myanmar, the second largest country in Southeast Asia. We therefore focus on agricultural land ownership and use patterns in Myanmar and employ nationally representative household survey data to document patterns at the national level and by agro-ecological zone. We explore inequality in landholdings, land tenure arrangements and documents, cropping patterns, and irrigation access.

Double Jeopardy: COVID-19, coup d'etat and poverty in Myanmar

Myanmar experienced four distinct COVID shocks to its economy over 2020 to early 2022 as well as a military takeover in February 2021 that created severe political, civil and economic turmoil. COVID and the coup d’état reversed a decade of growth and poverty reduction, but the full extent of the crisis on household poverty has remained uncertain because of the challenges of conducting large-scale in-person welfare surveys during the pandemic and recent political instability. Here we combine ex ante simulation models with diverse phone survey evidence from mid-2020 to early 2022 to estimate the poverty impacts of these shocks and some of the mechanisms behind them. Both simulations and surveys are consistent in painting a grim picture of rising poverty, capital-depleting coping mechanisms, and the complete collapse of government-provided social protection.

Poverty measurement by phone: Developing and testing alternative poverty metrics from the nationally representative Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), Round 1 (December 2021-January 2022)

Poverty measurement in low and middle income countries (LMICs) has always been challenging, especially among rural households whose incomes are characterized by seasonality, informality and some degree of subsistence consumption. During the COVID-19 pandemic poverty measurement became even more challenging as research had to resort phone surveys, who necessary brevity precludes the use of detailed household expenditure modules preferred in rural settings. Phone surveys instead typically resorted to qualitative questions on income losses and other welfare impacts of economic shocks. Here we use the new nationally representative Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS) to experiment with three kinds of poverty measures: (1) Asset poverty (10 questions); (2) Income poverty (a maximum of 17 questions); and (3) Food expenditure poverty (based on 4 questions). We first describe the methods for constructing these three indicators – including the poverty lines used for income and food poverty – and their conceptual strengths and weaknesses, before turning to a descriptive analysis of their geographical patterns, their associations with each other and with expenditure-based poverty in the last national survey in 2017. We then test their ability to predict poor diet quality and experiences of hunger, which – based on previous studies – are outcomes that ought to be highly sensitive to household poverty. We draw three important conclusions for measuring poverty in phone surveys. First, asset poverty and income poverty are strongly associated with each other, and with state/region poverty patterns of expenditure-based poverty in 2017. Second, asset poverty was consistently the strongest predictor of poor diet diversity among adults and children, as well as food insecurity at the household level, but income poverty also predicted these outcomes even after controlling for asset poverty. Third, we argue that phone surveys should measure both asset and income poverty, but should likely steer clear of food expenditure measures, which will either require overly long survey instruments, or very short questionnaires susceptible to underestimate of expenditure and overestimation of poverty. However, asset and income poverty are relatively quick and easy to measure, and conceptual complements to each other: income poverty is likely to be sensitive to shocks and seasonality, while asset poverty is insensitive to these fluctuations but captures long-term wealth. Finally, another important benefit of measuring income poverty is its ability to capture the effects of inflationary shocks, as inflation can affect both nominal incomes (e.g. through unemployment) as well as through the analyst’s price adjustments to the real food poverty line.

Livestock, capture fisheries, and aquaculture in Myanmar: Status and recent trends

Traditional forms of livestock-rearing and fishing have been central components in rural livelihoods in Myanmar for centuries and remain important today. More capital-intensive forms of marine fishing, aquaculture, and poultry farming began to expand during the early-1990s and grew briskly thereafter. This paper summarizes the status of the supply side of livestock, capture fisheries and aquaculture sectors in Myanmar, based on analysis of nationally representative data extracted from the Myanmar Living Conditions Survey 2017 and supporting information from other recent surveys and secondary sources. We examine levels of livestock ownership, participation in capture fisheries and aquaculture, reasons for rearing livestock, ownership of fishing assets, and household earnings from all three activities. We also discuss the characteristics of more geographically clustered, capitalintensive forms of poultry and swine farming, fishing, and fish farming, and the downturn in these sectors beginning in 2020 with the twin crises of COVID-19 and the coup. We conclude with a discussion of possible future directions for livestock farming, capture fisheries and aquaculture in Myanmar, along with priorities for sectoral upgrading.

Welfare and vulnerability: Findings from the first round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey

The first round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, was implemented between December 2021 and February 2022 with 12,100 households. This report discusses its findings related to shocks, livelihoods, coping strategies and food security. We find that almost 1 in 5 households experience physical insecurity, more than 1 in 10 were negatively affected by climatic shocks, and 3 in 5 experienced sickness or death of household members in the past three months. Two thirds of households reported a lower income in the beginning of 2022 compared to 12 months earlier, indicating widespread impacts of the pandemic, the political crisis, and the ensuing economic crisis. Ninety percent of households applied at least one coping strategy to deal with lack of food or money during the past month. More than half of all households lowered food and non-food expenditures. A large number of households also used more dramatic coping strategies, including high-risk income generating activities (4 percent), children working (3 percent of households), migration (1 percent), or selling of the dwelling or land (1 percent). Even though data were collected in the beginning of 2022 after the monsoon harvest and thus a relatively favorable time of the year for food security, still 9 percent of the households did not have an adequate food consumption pattern and 4 percent suffered from moderate or severe hunger. Violent events in the township, self-reported physical insecurity, climatic and health shocks all are strongly associated with negative outcomes for income, coping and food security. Chin and Kayah state experienced high levels of violence and consistently perform worse across the range of welfare indicators considered.

Rice productivity in Myanmar: Assessment of the 2021 monsoon and outlook for 2022

We analyze rice input and productivity data for the monsoon seasons of 2020 and 2021 from the Myanmar Agriculture Performance Survey (MAPS). The survey covers plots of 2,672 rice producers, spread over 259 townships in all states/regions of the country. We find that: 1. Rice productivity at the national level during the monsoon of 2021 decreased on average by 2.1 percent compared to the monsoon of 2020. Considering estimated area reductions, national paddy production decreased by 3.4 percent compared to the monsoon of 2020. 2. Some areas performed substantially worse. Rice yields were low and declined significantly in Kayah and Chin, two conflict-affected states that have shown the highest levels of food insecurity in recent assessments. 3. Prices for most inputs used in rice cultivation increased significantly between these two seasons. Prices of urea, the most important chemical fertilizer used by rice farmers, increased by 56 percent on average and mechanization costs increased by 19 percent. 4. Paddy prices at the farm increased by 8 percent, significantly less than input prices, squeezing rice farmers’ profits during the monsoon of 2021. Despite the substantial hurdles in production and marketing due to the political crisis and international market developments, the results of the Myanmar Agricultural Performance Survey show the overall resilience of rice production during the monsoon of 2021. While the rice sector has been a source of stability in the country, the situation for future crop seasons is however concerning given further increases in input prices (especially fertilizer), the overall reduced profitability of rice farming, the reduced coping strategies remaining for rice farmers, and currency policy changes by the military government.

Impact of a gender and nutrition behavioral change communication amid the COVID-19 crisis in Myanmar’s Central Dry Zone

Social behavior change communication (SBCC) interventions on gender and nutrition are now commonly implemented, but their impact on diet quality and empowerment is rarely assessed rigorously. We estimate the impact of a nutrition and gender SBCC intervention on women’s dietary diversity and empowerment in Myanmar during an especially challenging period—the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. The intervention was implemented as a cluster-randomized controlled trial in 30 villages in Myanmar’s Central Dry Zone. Our analysis employs data from the baseline survey implemented in February 2020 and a phone survey implemented in February–March 2021 and focuses on women’s dietary diversity and sub-indicators of the project-level women’s empowerment in agriculture index (pro-WEAI). Two indicators of women’s empowerment―inputs to productive decisions and access to and decisions over credit―improved, indicating that SBCC interventions can contribute to changing gendered perceptions and behaviors; however, most of the empowerment indicators did not change, indicating that much of gendered norms and beliefs take time to change. Women’s dietary diversity scores were higher by half a food group out of 10 in treatment villages. More women in treatment villages consumed nuts, milk, meat or fish, and Vitamin A–rich foods daily than in control villages. We show that even in the setting of a pandemic, a SBCC intervention can be delivered through a range of tools, including household visits, phone-based coaching, and voice-based training, that are responsive to local and individual resource limitations. Gender messaging can change some gendered perceptions; but it may take more time to change deeply ingrained gender norms. Nutrition messaging can help counter the declines in dietary quality that would be expected from negative shocks to supply chains and incomes.

Phone surveillance, from scratch: Novel sample design features of the nationally representative Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS)

The first round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS)–a nationwide phone panel consisting of 12,100 households–was implemented between December 2021 and February 2022. The objective of the survey was to collect data on a wide range of household and individual welfare indicators–including wealth, livelihoods, unemployment, food insecurity, diet quality, health shocks, and coping strategies–in a country exceptionally hard hit by conflict, severe economic collapse, and several damaging waves of COVID-19. The respondents interviewed in the MHWS were purposely selected from a large phone database aimed at being representative at the region/state level and urban/rural level in Myanmar. In this paper, we discuss two key steps taken to ensure that the MHWS is nationally and subnationally representative at the state/region and urban/rural level. First, we used a quota-based sampling strategy by setting survey quotas for respondents’ geography, education, farming status, gender, and rural/urban residence. This sampling strategy is used to address the well-known drawbacks of phone survey samples (e.g., the over-sampling of more educated respondents) and the survey’s particular interest in over-sampling farm households and equally sampling men and women. Second, we constructed household, population, and individual level weighting factors to further ensure that the survey generates nationally and subnationally representative statistics. To assess the effectiveness of these two strategies on achieving representativeness and consistency with previous surveys, we compare results from the MHWS to earlier nationally representative datasets, focusing on sample sizes of interviewed households for each state/region, and on education levels, farm/non-farm occupation, urban/rural residence, as well as respondents’ housing characteristics, which are unlikely to change substantially over short periods of time. We show that the phone-based MHWS has broader geographical coverage than previous national surveys, reaching 310 of Myanmar’s 330 townships. Moreover, our sampling approach was generally effective in reducing the education bias of phone surveys, except for a handful of states/regions. The MHWS is also unique in providing equal representation of male and female respondents. Additionally, the MHWS sampling and weighting strategies produce statistics on key indicators that closely mirror results from the two most recent national surveys in Myanmar. Overall, the results suggest that these strategies are successful in generating a subnationally representative phone survey that collected data on a rich array of household welfare indicators in exceptionally difficult political and economic circumstances.

Agricultural value chains in a fragile state: The case of rice in Myanmar

Nearly one-quarter of the global population lives in fragile states. Yet, despite the enormous importance of these areas for reducing global poverty and food insecurity, there is relatively little research examining how agricultural value chains, crucial for assuring food security, respond and adapt to such contexts. This paper analyzes Myanmar’s rice value chain–its most important staple crop and largest value chain–during the economic collapse and political instability caused by a military coup in early 2021. It relies on unique data collected with a large sample of rice retailers and millers before and after the coup. Despite many challenges in the rice value chain after the coup, such as banking and transport, rice processing and trade continued, assuring availability of rice in most retail markets and illustrating the resilience of the value chain to a major shock. While processing margins were mostly stable, an increased distribution margin (between rice millers and retailers) led to 11 percent higher average retail prices after the coup, implying welfare costs of almost USD 500 million. Using a market-pair regression method, we find that localized violence near sellers and buyers, distances traveled, and distance of vendors from international borders are associated with significantly increased rice price dispersion between rice retailers and mills. Despite the amalgam of problems to address in such settings, prioritizing the easing of transport restrictions, stabilizing fuel prices, and facilitating safe spatial arbitrage of food products would likely help prevent further food price inflation, assure higher farm prices, and improve welfare.

Beyond emergency relief: What will it take to ensure a resilient recovery for agriculture and the rural economy of Myanmar

The recent history of rural economic transformation in Myanmar and the effects of COVID-19 and the military coup in February 2021 provide important lessons for the design and implementation of plans to help the country recover from these scourges. The impoverishment of farming communities in Myanmar during decades of socialist military rule, beginning in the 1960s until the turn of the century, led to an outflux of migrants to neighboring countries. As the country opened up to foreign investment through economic reforms initiated in 2011, rural wages surged and farm mechanization services expanded rapidly. Together with increased remittance flows from migrants, higher rural household incomes drove growth in a wide range of non-farm service enterprises. Nevertheless, agricultural growth was low and most crop subsectors stagnated due to underlying and unresolved structural constraints such as poor infrastructure and inequality in land access. As in many other countries in Asia, border closures and lockdowns instituted to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in early 2020 resulted in widespread employment and income losses. The Myanmar government pro-actively sought to mitigate the impacts through expanded credit to farmers and businesses. By the end of 2020, Myanmar was beginning to recover from the economic stresses of COVID-19. However, the February 2021 military coup resulted in a far more severe economic downturn than COVID-19 due to the collapse of the financial system, the massive resignations by public sector employees, and the prolonged movement restrictions. Coup-induced state failure greatly magnified the health and economic consequences of COVID-19 in terms of poverty, food insecurity, and stalled economic transformation. This paper uses a combination of macro, meso, and micro-level analyses to measure the impacts of COVID-19 and state failure on rural economic transformation through the lens of the agri-food system, and to draw lessons for policies to support broad-based and resilient economic recovery.

Myanmar's microfinance sector, agriculture, and COVID-19: Emerging insights and new challenges

This Working Paper takes comprehensive stock of the impacts of the first two waves of COVID-19 (in Q2 and Q4 2020) on the microfinance sector in Myanmar. We discuss potential impact pathways, review responses to the crisis, and present new quantitative analysis based on a set of surveys with respondents throughout the agricultural value chain. Additionally, we briefly review impacts since the military takeover on February 1, 2021. Overall, various disruptions to the microfinance sector, particularly during peak periods of COVID-19, significantly reduced overall lending from April 2020, onward. These disruptions, along with disruptions to external financing, led to greater informal borrowing, likely greater indebtedness, and lower food security. However, responses and financing accommodations to microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Q2 and Q3 2020 cushioned the sector against widespread insolvency. The events since the military takeover are creating new challenges, exacerbating the aforementioned impacts, and raising new risks of MFI insolvency and broader crises around food security, indebtedness, and poverty. Considering these findings, stakeholder recommendations underscore the importance of easing the movement of international and domestic goods. Efforts should be focused on meeting the MFIs’ need for loanable funds through mechanisms such as exchange rate hedging, credit guarantees, and loan enhancement, while continuing to encourage flexibility around existing financing. When the time comes for a full recovery, there should be a focus on facilitating additional financial injections so that MFIs can more effectively restart lending operations.

Myanmar's poverty and food insecurity crisis: Support to agriculture and food assistance is urgently needed to preserve a foundation for recovery

National poverty rates in Myanmar have risen dramatically due to economic disruption following the February 1, 2021 military take-over of government. Depending on assumptions about the scale of the economic impacts, household poverty rates are predicted to have risen to between 40 and 50 percent in 2021, compared to 32 percent in 2015 and just under 25 percent in 2017. Between 849,000 and 1.87 million new households are thus living in poverty in 2021 in addition to the estimated 2.86 million households already in poverty in 2015. The poverty impacts of these disruptions are significant not only in the sharp increases in the total number of households in poverty, but also in the substantial deepening of poverty for households that were already poor. By the end of the current financial year, the average poverty gap (expenditure shortfall) is predicted to have increased from 26 percent in 2015 to between 34 and 40 percent for individuals living in poor households.

Urban food prices under lockdown: Evidence from Myanmar’s traditional food retail sector during COVID-19

Many governments imposed stringent lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic as a public health measure to suppress the spread of the disease. With consumer incomes already depressed, the potential impacts of these measures on urban food prices are of particular concern. This working paper examines the changes in Myanmar’s urban food prices during lockdown using detailed food price data collected from a panel of phone surveys conducted in August and September 2020 of 431 family-owned retail shops in Myanmar’s two largest cities, Yangon and Mandalay. We find that the supply side of Myanmar’s food retail sector was largely resilient to the shocks and lockdowns throughout the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Estimates from a fixed effects differencein-differences model reveal that food prices were 3 percent higher in townships under lockdown compared to those not under lockdown, a statistically significant but modest effect. Lockdowns had smaller effects on prices for highly processed food items sourced directly from companies, but larger effects on prices for raw or lightly processed commodities sourced through wholesale markets, which comprise a larger share of urban consumer’s diets. Retailer margins did not change significantly under lockdown restrictions, suggesting no evidence of price gouging. Overall, our findings of a modest impact of the lockdown on urban food prices underscore the importance of keeping the food supply chain–including wholesale markets and retail shops–functioning as completely and as safely as possible during times of crisis, as was mostly the case early in the crisis for the two cities in this study.

The outlook for Myanmar’s inorganic fertilizer use and 2021 crop harvest: An ex-ante assessment

International inorganic fertilizer prices and shipping costs substantially increased in 2021 compared to a year earlier. This will lead to significantly higher border prices for fertilizer in Myanmar, an important development as Myanmar imports almost all of its fertilizer from abroad. The impacts of the current political crisis on the local transport sector and the depreciation of the Myanmar currency, the kyat, will further increase domestic fertilizer prices. Based on a survey of agro-retailers in March 2021, fertilizer prices were estimated to be 22 percent higher for urea and 10 percent higher for compound fertilizer compared to the same period a year earlier. In addition to these supply-side challenges, effective demand for inorganic fertilizer is expected to be lower in 2021 due to significantly reduced farmer incomes, lower credit availability, and more uncertain agricultural profitability. Given these international and local developments, fertilizer use in Myanmar in 2021 will be substantially less than normal. Ex-ante simulations, which assume a ratio of additional crop output per unit of fertilizer applied between three and five, indicate that a reduction of fertilizer use–all else equal–in the country to half the level of a normal year would reduce agricultural output in 2021 by between 9 and 15 percent. Particularly, monsoon rice production will be affected. The Delta region produces half of Myanmar’s monsoon rice and uses about half of the inorganic fertilizer imported annually. Thus, the expected shocks to fertilizer markets in 2021 may have outsized effects on rice production levels in particular.

Myanmar migration in a time of transformation: 2011-2020

Rural out-migration to both domestic and international destinations counts among the key phenomena that defined a decade of transformation in Myanmar from the 2011 economic reforms until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. We analyze data from four surveys conducted in different areas of rural Myanmar from 2015 to 2018, along with relevant literature, to highlight trends in migration and its contributions to economic growth and rural development. Studied areas include Mon State, as well as parts of the Ayeyarwady Delta, the Central Dry Zone, and Shan State.

Agro-processing, food prices, and COVID-19 shocks: Evidence from Myanmar’s rice mills

The COVID-19 pandemic has stressed global agri-food systems at a critical time. Poverty rates have increased and food security is a growing concern for the most vulnerable. Even in the advanced stages of the pandemic, the shocks to many sectors of agri-food systems are not well understood. This paper assesses the impacts of COVID-19 on the processing sector of Myanmar’s agri-food system.

Opportunities and constraints for production and income growth in rural Myanmar: Inter-regional variations in the composition of agriculture, livelihoods, and the rural economy

This working paper synthesizes findings from four large household and community surveys in Myanmar, each covering a major agro-ecological zone, to evaluate inter-regional variations in the composition of agriculture, livelihoods, and the rural economy, and prospects for production and income growth.

Agri-food trade in Myanmar: Its role in Myanmar’s future economic takeoff

Agri-food exports are important for Myanmar’s economic takeoff, in particular for the transformation of agri-food systems. This paper analyzes the past performance of key agri-food exports and assess their role and future potential to contribute to the transformation of Myanmar’s agri-food system and the overall economy.

Impacts of COVID-19 on Myanmar’s poultry sector: Implications for achieving the sustainable development goals

This paper analyzes the impact of COVID-19 on two types of poultry production systems, broilers and layers, in Myanmar using five waves of telephone surveys from June to August 2020. The surveys were implemented with 269 poultry farms previously surveyed in 2019. The slow supply response of layer farms to increased egg demand after the initial COVID-19 shocks has resulted in higher egg prices for consumers. This, in turn, has affected nutritional intake, making it more difficult for Myanmar to achieve the second Sustainable Development Goal of ending hunger and malnutrition by 2030. Within both broiler and layer production systems are found both integrated poultry and fish farms and pure poultry farms. For layer farms, integration of poultry production with fish has provided a buffer against risk; the bankruptcy rate among integrated layer-fish farms was much lower than among pure layer farms. However, such advantages of integration of poultry with fish production are not seen for broiler farms.

Poverty and food insecurity during COVID-19: Telephone survey evidence from mothers in rural and urban Myanmar

Myanmar had one of the lowest confirmed COVID-19 caseloads in the world in mid-2020 and was one of the few developing countries not projected to go into economic recession. However, macroeconomic projections are likely to be a poor guide to individual and household welfare in a fast-moving crisis that has involved disruption to an unusually wide range of sectors and livelihoods. To explore the impacts of COVID-19 disruptions on household poverty and coping strategies, as well as maternal food insecurity experiences, this study used a telephone survey conducted in June and July 2020 covering 2,017 mothers of nutritionally vulnerable young children in urban Yangon and rural villages of Myanmar’s Dry Zone. Stratifying results by location, livelihoods, and asset-levels, and using retrospective questions on pre-COVID-19 incomes and various COVID-19 impacts, we find that the vast majority of households have been adversely affected from loss of income and employment. Over three-quarters cite income/job losses as the main impact of COVID-19 – median incomes declined by one third and $1.90/day income-based poverty rose by around 27 percentage points between January and June 2020. Falling into poverty was most strongly associated with loss of employment (including migrant employment), but also with recent childbirth. The poor commonly coped with income losses through taking loans/credit, while better-off households drew down on savings and reduced non-food expenditures. Self-reported food insecurity experiences were much more common in the urban sample than in the rural sample, even though income-based and asset-based poverty were more prevalent in rural areas. In urban areas, around one quarter of respondents were worried about food quantities and quality, and around 10 percent stated that there were times when they had run out of food or gone hungry. Respondents who stated that their household had lost income or experienced food supply problems due to COVID-19 were more likely to report a variety of different food insecurity experiences. These results raise the concern that the welfare impacts of the COVID-19 crisis are much more serious and widespread than macroeconomic projections would suggest. Loss of employment and casual labor are major drivers of increasing poverty. Consequently, economic recovery strategies must emphasize job creation to revitalize damaged livelihoods. However, a strengthened social protection strategy should also be a critical component of economic recovery to prevent adversely affected households from falling into poverty traps and to avert the worst forms of food insecurity and malnutrition, particularly among households with pregnant women and young children. The recent second wave of COVID-19 infections in Myanmar from mid-August onwards makes the expansion of social protection even more imperative.

Impacts of COVID-19 on Myanmar’s agri-food system: Evidence base and policy implications

Between April and October 2020, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Michigan State University (MSU), with support from the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) and the Livelihoods and Food Security Fund (LIFT), have undertaken analyses of secondary data combined with regular telephone surveys of actors at all stages of Myanmar’s agri-food system in order to better understand the impacts of COVID-19 on the system. These analyses show that the volume of agribusiness has slowed considerably in Myanmar since COVID-19 restrictions were put in place. There is lower demand from farmers for agricultural inputs and mechanization services and lower volumes of produce traded, especially exports to neighboring countries whose borders are closed. All actors in the agri-food system are facing liquidity constraints and experiencing increased difficulties in both borrowing and recovering loans.

Assessing the impacts of COVID-19 on household incomes and poverty in Myanmar: A microsimulation approach

With policy measures imposed by governments around the world to contain and prevent the spread of COVID 19, global and domestic economic activities and trade flows have been interrupted. The unexpected shocks of COVID 19 negatively affect not only Myanmar’s economy, but also the livelihoods of Myanmar households. This Working Paper assesses such impacts at the household level using a microsimulation model based on the Myanmar Poverty and Living Conditions Survey (MPLCS) conducted in 2015.

Assessing the impacts of COVID-19 on Myanmar’s economy: A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) multiplier approach

The policy measures taken by the Government of Myanmar to contain the transmission of COVID-19 are a necessary and appropriate response to the pandemic. In-depth analysis of policy measures of this magnitude on firms, households, government, and the economy as a whole is key to the design of policy interventions that can mitigate the economic losses and support a sustained and robust recovery. In this policy paper, we use a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) multiplier model to assess the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on Myanmar’s economy. The SAM multiplier model is a simulation tool ideally suited to measuring short-term direct and indirect economy-wide impacts of unanticipated, rapid-onset economic shocks, such as COVID-19. The multiplier model builds on a SAM, which is a database that captures resource flows associated with all economic transactions taking place in an economy and represents the structure of the economy at a point in time by showing the interlinkages and relationships between actors, i.e., productive activities, households, governments, and relationships with the rest of the world. The Myanmar SAM captures 63 distinct activities or sectors to characterize Myanmar’s economy in 2019.